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ABSTRACT
The modern development in doxastic (and epistemic) logic started with Jaakko HintikkaÕs
seminal book Knowledge and Belief (1962).  In a doxastic logic of Hintikka-type, with a mo-
dal operator B standing for Òthe agent believes thatÓ, it is possible to represent and reason
about the static aspects of an agentÕs beliefs about the world.  Such logic studies various con-
straints that a rational agent or a set of rational agents should satisfy.
A Hintikka-type logic cannot, however, be used to reason about doxastic change, i.e., vari-
ous kinds of doxastic actions that an agent may perform.  The agent may, for instance, revise
his beliefs by adding a new piece of information, while at the same time making adjustments
to his stock of beliefs in order to preserve consistency.  Or he may contract his beliefs by
giving up a proposition that he formerly believed.  Such operations of doxastic change are
studied in the theories of rational belief change that started with the work of Alchourrn,
Grdenfors and Makinson in the 80Õs: the so-called AGM-approach.
The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not logics in the
strict sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change.  Instead of characterizing
the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-approach
uses a natural language Ð ordinary mathematical English Ð to characterize the mathematical
structures that are under study.  Recently, however, various authors such as Johan van
Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing doxastic change within a formal
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2logical language: a dynamic modal logic.  Inspired by these suggestions Krister Segerberg has
developed a very general logical framework for reasoning about doxastic change: dynamic
doxastic logic (DDL).  This framework may be seen as an extension of standard Hintikka-
style doxastic logic, with dynamic operators, such as [ * j ] or [Ð j ], representing various kinds
of transformations of the agent's doxastic state: Ôafter revising with j , it would be the case
that ÉÕ, Ôafter contracting with a , it would be the case that ÉÕ, etc.. Thus, formulas such as
[ *j ]By  can be used to describe the agentÕs doxastic state after various transformations.
The kind of DDL that has been mainly studied so far Ð basic DDL Ð describes an agent
who has opinions about the external world and an ability to change these opinions in the light
of new information.  Such an agent is non-introspective in the sense of lacking opinions about
his own  belief state (his own beliefs and his own dispositions for belief change).  The agent's
own belief state is not a part of the reality that he has beliefs about.
In our paper, we discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic for
introspective agents: agents who have the ability both to form higher-order beliefs and to
reflect upon and change their minds about their own beliefs. The project of constructing such
a logic Ð full DDL or DDL unlimited Ð is ridden with difficulties due to the fact that the
agentÕs own doxastic state (his beliefs as well as his doxastic dispositions) now becomes a
part of the reality he is trying to explore. When an introspective agent learns more about the
world (and himself) then the reality he holds beliefs about undergoes a change.  But then his
introspective (higher-order) beliefs have to be adjusted accordingly.
In the paper, we consider various ways of solving this problem.  In particular, we outline a
two-dimensional semantics for belief change.  When an introspective agent gets new infor-
mation, his doxastic state changes.  Thereby the total state, of which his belief state is a part,
changes as well.  What are then his beliefs about?  Is it the original state or the new one?  One
would like to say that he has beliefs about both.  In general, therefore, we have to distinguish
between the state in which beliefs are held (the point of evaluation) and the state about which
certain things are believed (the point of reference). Within this two-dimensional approach,
one can easily characterize reasonable constraints on the agentÕs new beliefs about the origi-
nal state. Essentially, they correspond to the AGM-axioms. It is more difficult to determine
what the agent should believe about the new state, in particular which of the beliefs about the
old state should also extend to the new one and which should be appropriately modified. We
3make some suggestions as to what such transfer principles might look like, but there is more
work to be done in this direction.
1.  Static doxastic logic: HintikkaÕs logic of knowledge and belief
The modern development in doxastic logic (the logic of belief) and epistemic logic (the logic
of knowledge) started with Jaakko HintikkaÕs seminal book Knowledge and Belief (1962).
HintikkaÕs basic idea was to apply the possible worlds semantics for modal logic to so-called
propositional attitude constructions like Òbelieves thatÓ and Òknows thatÓ.  According to
Hintikka to ascribe knowledge to a person x is to invoke the idea of a set of ÒepistemicallyÓ
possible worlds (with respect to the person x).  These worlds, the personÕs epistemic alterna-
tives are precisely the worlds that are compatible with everything that the person knows (in
the actual world).  Although they all agree with respect to what the person knows, they still
differ in ways that make them incompatible with each other.  The analogy with necessity
leads to the following principle for knowledge:
x knows that a  (in the actual world) if and only if, in every possible world compatible
with what x knows it is the case that a .
Similarly, the concept of belief appeals to the idea of a set of ÒdoxasticallyÓ possible worlds
(the agentÕs doxastic alternatives).  The corresponding principle is:
x believes that a  if and only if, in every possible world compatible with what x believes
it is the case that a .
It is natural to assume:
(i) Knowledge implies truth.  Hence, the actual world is itself one of the possible
worlds that is compatible with everything the agent knows in the actual world.
That is, the actual world is one of the epistemic alternatives for the agent in the
actual world.
(ii) Knowledge implies belief.  Hence, if a possible world is compatible with eve-
rything the agent believes, then it is compatible with everything he knows.
That is, the set of doxastic alternatives is a subset of the set of epistemic alter-
natives.
4In the formal development of doxastic/epistemic logic, Hintikka extends a language of
sentential or predicate logic with special operators of knowledge and belief:
Ka   for Òthe agent knows that a Ó.
Ba for Òthe agent believes that a Ó.
Writing |= a  for a  being logically valid, i.e., true in every world in every model, one gets
the following minimal set of principles for Hintikka-style epistemic/doxastic logic:
(1) |= K(a  fi  b ) fi  (Ka  fi  Kb )
(2) |= B(a  fi  b ) fi  (Ba  fi  Bb )
(3) |= Ka  fi  a (Veridicality of Knowledge)
(4) |= Ka  fi  Ba
(5) If |= a , then |= Ka
(6) If |= a , then  |= Ba
From now on, our main subject will be the concept of belief.  The principles (2) and (6),
although by no means uncontroversial, will constitute our basic logic for the belief operator
B.  By imposing additional requirements on the doxastic alternativeness relation, one can
ensure that some or all of the following principles are also satisfied:
(Cons) |=  Ø B^  (Consistency)
5(VPI) |=  BBa  fi  Ba  (Veridicality of Positive Introspection)
(VNI) |=  Ø B^  fi ( BØ Ba  fi  Ø Ba )  (Veridicality of Negative Introspection)
(PI) |=  Ba  fi  BBa  (Positive Introspection)
(NI) |= Ø Ba  fi  BØ Ba  (Negative Introspection)
(Cons), for example, says that a logical contradiction (symbolised by ^ ) is never believed.
(NI) says that if the agent does not believe that a , then he believes that he does not believe
that a.  These and other principles for iterated beliefs will be discussed in due course.
2.  AGM-type theories of belief change
In a doxastic logic of Hintikka-type, with a modal operator B standing for Òthe agent believes
thatÓ, it is possible to represent and reason about the static aspects of an agentÕs beliefs about
the world.  Such a logic studies various constraints that a rational agent or a set of rational
agents should satisfy.  A Hintikka-type logic cannot, however, be used to reason about doxas-
tic change, i.e., various kinds of doxastic actions that an agent may perform.  The agent may,
for instance, revise his beliefs by adding a new piece of information, while at the same time
making adjustments to his stock of beliefs in order to preserve consistency.  Or he may con-
tract his beliefs by giving up a proposition that he formerly believed.  Such operations of
doxastic change are studied in the theories of rational belief change that started with the work
of Alchourrn, Grdenfors and Makinson in the 80Õs: the so-called AGM-approach.1  Accord-
ing to AGM, there are three basic types of doxastic actions:
Expansion:  The agent adds a new belief a  to his stock of old beliefs without giving up
any old beliefs.  If G is the set of old beliefs, then G+ a  denotes the set of beliefs that
results from expanding G with a .  To expand is dangerous, since G+ a  might very well
be logically inconsistent; and inconsistency is something that we should try to avoid in
our beliefs.
                                                
1 Cf. Alchourrn, Grdenfors, Makinson (1985) and Grdenfors (1988).
6Contraction:  The agent gives up a proposition a  that was formerly believed. This
requires that he also gives up other propositions that logically imply the proposition a .
We use GÐa  to denote the result of contracting a  from the old set G of beliefs.
Revision:  The revision G * a  of the set G with the new information a  is the result of
adding a  to G in such a way that consistency is preserved whenever possible.  The idea
is that G *a  should be a set of beliefs that preserves as much as possible of the informa-
tion that is contained in G and still contains a .  G * a  should be a minimal change of G
that incorporates a .
The following is an important guiding principle when revising and contracting belief sets:
The Principle of Conservatism:  Try not to give up or add information to your original
belief set unnecessarily.
Within the AGM approach, the agentÕs belief state is represented by his belief set, i.e., the set
G of all sentences a  such that the agent believes that a .  An underlying classical consequence
operation Cn is assumed and the operation of expansion + is defined by
G+ a = Cn(G ¨  {a }).
By contrast, the operations of contraction and revision are characterized only axiomatically.
Thus, the operation of revision is assumed to satisfy the axioms:
 (R1) Cn(G) = G (Logical Closure)
(R2)  a  ˛  G *a (Success)
(R3) G *a  ˝  G+ a (Inclusion)
(R4)  if Øa  ˇ  G, then G ˝  G *a (Preservation)
(R5)  if ^  ˇ  Cn({ a }), then ^  ˇ  G *a  (Consistency)
(R6)  if Cn({ a }) = Cn({b }), then G*a  = G *b (Congruence)
(R7) G * ( a  Ù  b)  ˝  (G *  a )+ b
(R8) if Ø  b  ˇ  G *a , then (G *  a ) ˝  G * ( a  Ù  b) .
The first four axioms imply:
if Øa  ˇ  G, then G *a  = G+ a , (Expansion)
7i.e., if the new information a  is consistent with G, then G *a  is simply the expansion of G
with a .  Consistency says that if a  is consistent, then G *a  is also consistent.  According to
Congruence, if a  and b  are logically equivalent, then revising G with a  yields the same result
as revising G with b .  In view of (R1) and (R2), the last two axioms yield:
Ø  b  ˇ  G *a , then G* (a  Ù  b)  = (G *a )+ b (Revision by Conjunction)
i.e., if b  is consistent with G*a , then revising G with ( a  Ù  b)  yields the same result as first
revising G with a  and then expanding the result with b .
AGM also contains axioms for contraction (omitted here) as well as the following bridging
principles:
G *a  = (GÐ Øa )+a (The Levi identity)
GÐ a  = (G *a ) ˙  (G *Øa ) (The Harper identity)
The Levi identity says that the result of revising the belief set G by the sentence a equals
the result of first making room for a  by (if necessary) contracting G with Ø a  and then expan-
ding the result with a .  The Harper identity says that the result of contracting a  from G is the
common part of G revised with a  and G revised with Øa .
GroveÕs (1988) possible worlds modelling for AGM
In his (1988) paper, Grove presents two closely related possible worlds modellings of AGM-
type belief revision, one in terms of a family of ÒspheresÓ around the agentÕs belief set (or
theory) G and the other in terms of an epistemic entrenchment ordering of propositions.
Intuitively, a proposition a  is at least as entrenched in the agentÕs belief set as another propo-
sition b  if and only if the following holds: provided the agent would have to revise his beliefs
so as to falsify the conjunction a Ê Ù Ê b , he should do it in such a way as to allow for the falsity
of b .
GroveÕs spheres may be thought of as possible ÒfallbackÓ theories relative to the agentÕs
original theory: theories that he may reach by deleting propositions that are not ÒsufficientlyÓ
entrenched.  To put it differently, fallbacks are theories that are closed upwards under
entrenchment: if T is a fallback, a  belongs to T, and b  is at least as entrenched as a , then b
8also belongs to T.  The entrenchment ordering can be recovered from the family of fallbacks
by the definition: a  is at least as entrenched as b  if and only if a  belongs to every fallback to
which b  belongs.
Representing propositions as sets of possible worlds, and also representing theories as such
sets (rather than as sets of propositions), the following picture illustrates GroveÕs family of
spheres around a given theory G and his definition of revision.  Notice that the spheres around
a theory are ÒnestedÓ, i.e., linearly ordered. For any two spheres, one is included in the other.
GroveÕs family of spheres closely resembles LewisÕ sphere semantics for counterfactuals, the
main difference being that LewisÕ spheres are ÒcenteredÓ around a single world instead of a
theory (a set of worlds).
The shaded area H represents the revision of G with a proposition a .  The revision of G
with a  is defined as the strongest a -permitting fallback theory of G expanded with a .  In the
possible worlds representation, this is the intersection of a  with the smallest sphere around G
that is compatible with a .  (Any revision has to contain the proposition we revise with.
Therefore, if a  is logically inconsistent, the revision with a  is taken to be the inconsistent
theory.)
Lindstrm and Rabinowicz: relational belief revision
In a series of papers, Lindstrm and Rabinowicz have proposed a generalization LR of the
AGM approach according to which belief revision was treated as a relation GR
a
H between
9theories (belief sets) rather than as a function on theories.2  The idea was to allow for there
being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition.  Thus, GR
a
H
means that H is one of those reasonable revisions of the theory G with the new information a .
AGM, of course, assumes that belief revision is functional (or deterministic), that is,
if GR
a
H and GR
a
HÕ, then H = HÕ.
Given this assumption, one can define:
G *a  = the theory H such that GR
a
H.
The relational notion of belief revision results from weakening epistemic entrenchment by
not assuming it to be connected. In other words, we allow that some propositions may be
incomparable with respect to epistemic entrenchment.  As a result, in LR the family of fall-
backs around a given theory will no longer be nested.  It will no longer be a family of spheres
but rather a family of ÒellipsesÓ.  This change opens up for the possibility of several different
ways of revising a theory with a given proposition.
In this figure, the two ellipses represent two different fallback theories for G, each of which is
a strongest a -permitting fallback.  Consequently, there are two possible revisions of G with
a : each one of H and K is the intersection of a  with a strongest a -permitting fallback.
                                                
2 Cf. Lindstrm and Rabinowicz (1989), (1990), (1992) and Rabinowicz and Lindstrm
(1994).
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3.  Dynamic doxastic logic
The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not doxastic logics in
the formal sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change.  Instead of charac-
terizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-
approach uses a natural language Ñ like ordinary mathematical English Ñ to characterize the
mathematical structures that are under study..
Recently, however, various authors such as van Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have sug-
gested representing epistemic change within a formal logical language: a dynamic modal
logic.  Inspired by these suggestions Krister Segerberg has developed a very general logical
framework for reasoning about doxastic change: dynamic doxastic logic (DDL).3  This fra-
mework may be seen as an extension of standard Hintikka-style doxastic logic with dynamic
operators representing various kinds of transformations of the agent's doxastic state.
Segerberg writes + a , * a , and Ð a , respectively, for the doxastic actions of expanding, revi-
sing and contracting the agentÕs beliefs with (the information contained in) the sentence a .
Hence, +a denotes the action of simply adding a  to the stock of beliefs (without checking for
consistency).  * a  is the action of adding a , while at the same time modifying the belief state
in such a way that consistency is preserved, whenever possible.  Ð a , finally, means that the
agent changes his belief state in such a way that any belief that a  is given up.
In DDL, one uses the following notation with the following informal meaning:
[+a ]b .  ÒIf the agent were to expand his beliefs with a , then it would be the case that b Ó.
[ *a ] b .  ÒIf the agent were to revise his beliefs with a , then it would be the case that b Ó.
[Ð a ] b  .  ÒIf the agent were to contract his beliefs with a , then it would be the case that b Ó.
As long as the agentÕs belief state is not part of the world, doxastic actions do not affect the
world.  Thus, if b  expresses a worldly proposition, i.e., a proposition that only concerns the
(external) world, then we should expect [+a ]b «  b  to hold, and similarly for the other doxas-
tic actions.  So the interesting case is the one when b  contains epistemic operators.  In par-
ticular, we are interested in statements of the forms: [+a ]Bb , [ *a ]Bb, [Ð a ]Bb .  For example,
                                                
3  Cf. Segerberg (1995), (1996), (1997), (1999a) and (1999b).
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[ *a ]Bb
means: if the agent were to revise his beliefs with a , he would believe b .  In the AGM appro-
ach this kind of statement is expressed as:
b  ˛  G *a ,
where G refers to the agentÕs current belief set, i.e., the set of all sentences s  such that the
agent believes s , and G * a  is the belief set that results from revising G by a .  In AGM,
[+a ]Bb  and [Ða ]Bb  correspond to, respectively, b  ˛  G+ a  and b  ˛  GÐ a.
DDL allows for the possibility of belief change being nondeterministic: there may be many
different ways for the agent of revising his beliefs with a (Cf. Lindstrm & Rabinowicz
above).  Hence, we must distinguish between:
[ *a ]Bb ÒIf the agent were to revise his beliefs with a , he would believe that b Ó.
<*a >Bb  ÒIf the agent were to revise his beliefs with a , he might believe that b Ó.
<*a > is definable in terms of [*a ] in the following way:
<*a > b  = Ø [ *a ] Øb .
In the same way, one can define <+ a > and <Ða >.  For theories like the original AGM-theory
in which belief change is deterministic, one would have <*a > b  «  [ * a ] b , and similarly for
contraction.  Expansion, is of course always deterministic, i.e., <+ a > b  «  [+ a ] b.
In DDL, we think of the agentÕs belief state as being represented by what Segerberg calls a
hypertheory, or in the terminology of Lindstrm and Rabinowicz a system of fallbacks.  A
hypertheory encodes the agentÕs current beliefs as well as his dispositions for belief change.
Basic DDL
The kind of DDL that has been mainly studied so far Ð basic DDL Ð describes an agent who
has opinions about the external world and an ability to change these opinions in the light of
new information.  Such an agent is non-introspective in the sense of lacking opinions about
his own  belief state (his own beliefs and his own dispositions for belief change).  In the
semantics, there is a space U of points representing different states of the external world,
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where the agentÕs beliefs and doxastic dispositions are not part of the world that he has beliefs
about.  Consequently, the doxastic actions of the agent do not affect the world.
The object language for basic DDL can be described as follows.  We define the sets Term,
BForm and Form of terms, Boolean formulas and formulas to be the smallest sets satisfying
the following conditions:
(i) for any n < w , the propositional letter Pn belongs to BForm
(ii) ^  ˛  BForm
(iii) if a , b  ˛  BForm, then (a  fi b ) ˛  BForm
(iv) if a , b  ˛  Form, then (a  fi b ) ˛  Form
(v) if a  ˛  BForm, then a  ˛  Form
(vi) if a  ˛  BForm, then Ba  ˛ Form.
(vii) if a  ˛  BForm, then +a , Ða , *a  ˛  Term.
(viii) if t  ˛  Term and a  ˛ Form, then [ t ]a  ˛  Form.
The Boolean connectives Øa , (a  Ù  b ), etc. are defined from ^  and fi  in the usual way.
As is easily seen, basic DDL is severely limited in its expressive power.  To begin with,
the belief operator B only operates on Boolean formulas.  Thus introspection is disallowed,
i.e., formulas such as BØ Ba  or B[*a ] b  are not well-formed.  Secondly, the formula a  that we
contract, revise, or expand with, must always be Boolean.  Thus, formulas such as [ *Ø Ba ] b
are not well-formed either.  The reason for these limitations is obvious.  Since the agent only
holds beliefs about the world that his doxastic state is not a part of, he has no Òhigher orderÓ
beliefs.  And since he only receives information that concerns the external world, he cannot
revise his beliefs with propositions about his own doxastic state.
DDL Unlimited (Full DDL)
The language of unlimited (or full) DDL is obtained from that of basic DDL by removing the
syntactic limitations just mentioned.
That is in unlimited DDL, we let the belief operator B take any formula a  as argument.
Moreover, for any formula a , [+ a ], [Ð a ], [ * a ] are allowed as doxastic operators.  Thus the
sets of terms and formulas of full DDL can be defined in the following simple way:
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(i) the propositional letters Pn belongs to Form.
(ii) ^  ˛  Form.
(iii) If a , b  ˛  Form, then (a  fi b ) ˛  Form.
(iv) If a  ˛  Form, then Ba  ˛ Form.
(v) If a  ˛  Form, then +a , Ða , *a  ˛  Term.
(vi) If t  ˛  Term and a  ˛ Form, then [ t ]a  ˛  Form.
Once we have provided the language of  full DDL with a suitable semantics, we should be
able to describe agents who
(i) have beliefs about their own doxastic states as well as about the external world.
(ii) can change their beliefs in the light of new information about their own belief
states.
We say that such agents are fully introspective.
4.  Paradoxes of introspective belief change
The project of constructing a dynamic doxastic logic for a fully introspective agent is faced
with difficulties due to the fact that the agentÕs own doxastic state (his beliefs as well as his
doxastic dispositions) now becomes a part of the reality that he is trying to explore.
When an introspective agent learns more about the world (and himself) then the reality
that he holds beliefs about undergoes change.  But then his introspective (higher-order)
beliefs have to be adjusted accordingly.
We illustrate the problems that arise with two stories.
Story 1.4
We consider an agent who can only receive worldly propositions as his doxastic inputs, but
who is able to hold higher-order beliefs about his own current beliefs.  We also assume that
the following principles are satisfied:
                                                
4 The paradox presented in Story 1 is closely related to FuhrmannÕs (1989) Òparadox of
serious possibilityÓ.  Cf. also Levi (1988).
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(N) the operators B and [*a ], where a  is Boolean, are normal modal operators
(Normality)
(S) [ *a ]Ba (Success)
For any worldly proposition a , there is a way for the agent of revising his beliefs by a :
(PR) < *a > T , where T  is any tautology (Possibility of Revision)
A consistent agent cannot become inconsistent simply by learning a true fact about the
world:
(C) Ø B^  fi  ( a  fi  [ *a ] Ø B^ )
Then, we have a principle saying that no agent can believe both a  and that he does not
believe a,  unless, of course, his beliefs are inconsistent:
(M) Ø B^  fi  Ø B(a  Ù  Ø Ba )  (Moore«s Principle)
The Principle (M) is logically equivalent (relative to the base logic K) to:
Ø B^  fi  (Ba  fi  Ø BØ Ba ),
which says that if a consistent agent believes a , then it is consistent with his beliefs that he
believes a .  This in turn is nothing but the principle that we have earlier called Veridicality of
Negative Introspection:
Ø B^  fi ( BØ Ba  fi  Ø Ba ).
The next principle, finally, is one of the axioms of the AGM approach to belief revision:
(P) Ø BØa  fi  (Bb  fi  [ *a ]Bb ) (Preservation)
It says that if the new information a  is compatible with the agentÕs beliefs, then the agent
retains all his old beliefs when revising with a .
We are now going to show that these principles cannot all be maintained, i.e., together they
lead to an absurdity.
Suppose that our agent does not have an opinion one way or another whether:
a : It is raining in Uppsala
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That is,
(1) Ø Ba and Ø BØa .
The agent also believes (correctly) that he does not believe that it is raining in Uppsala:
(2) BØ Ba
Suppose also that as a matter of fact it is raining in Uppsala.
Consider now what happens when our agent learns that a  is true.  Then, he revises his
beliefs by a  after which he comes to believe a  (by Success):
(3) [ *a ]Ba .
From the fact that (1) Ø BØa  and (2) BØ Ba  it follows by Preservation that:
(4) [ *a ]BØ Ba .
But then (since B and [*a ] are normal modal operators)
(5) [ *a ](Ba  Ù  BØ Ba ),
which in turn yields:
(6) [ *a ]B(a  Ù  Ø Ba ),
i.e., after learning a , the agent believes that: a  and that he does not believe a.   But by
Moore«s Principle and the normality of [ *a ] we have that:
(7) [ *a ]B(a  Ù  Ø Ba ) fi  [ *a ]B^ .
Thus,
(8) [ *a ]B^.
That is, the agent becomes inconsistent simply by learning the true proposition a.   But since
the agent was not inconnsistent to start with, we get by (C) that:
(9) [ *a ] Ø B^.
(8) and (9) yield [*a ] ^ , which is contrary to the Possibility of Revision-principle.
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The principle to blame clearly seems to be Preservation.  From Normality, Success and
Preservation alone we get:
(Paradox) Ø BØa  Ù  BØ Ba  fi  [ *a ](Ba  Ù BØ Ba ).
This means, in particular, that if the agent holds no opinion as regards a  and correctly
believes that he does not believe a , then, upon revision with a , he will believe that a  and, at
the same time, believe that he does not believe a . But then he has at least one false belief,
namely that he does not believe a .  The requirement that *  should not be paradoxical in this
sense seems eminently plausible.
A natural conclusion is that we should give up Preservation for * : If I originally neither
believe nor disbelieve a  and am aware of this fact and if I then learn that a  is true, some of
my original beliefs must be given up.  In particular, I have to give up my original belief that I
do not believe a .  But as we shall see from our next story, giving up preservation does not
solve all our problems.
Story 2.
We are now considering an agent who has higher order beliefs about his own current beliefs
but is also able to revise his beliefs with doxastic propositions.
Consider the following story: as in our previous example,  a  is a true proposition which the
agent has no opinion about.  In particular, then, it is true that
(1) a  Ù  Ø Ba .
The agent is now informed that (1) holds; he has received true information. Since (1) is true, it
is clearly a consistent proposition. We would therefore expect that revision with (1) will not
lead the agent to an inconsistent belief state (Principle (C)).   In particular, then, it should be
the case that
(2) [ * ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )] Ø B^ .
But we also know that revision is supposed to satisfy Success.  Thus, upon the revision with
(1), the agent must believe that (1) holds:
(3) [ * ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )]B(a  Ù  Ø Ba ).
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But Normality together with Moore«s Principle yield:
(4) [ * ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )] Ø B^ fi  [ * ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )] Ø B(a  Ù  Ø Ba )
From (2) and (4) we get by modus ponens:
(5) [ * ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )] Ø B(a  Ù  Ø Ba ).
By Normality, (3) and (5) yield:
(6) [ * ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )] ^ .
Contrary to what we should expect, revision with a true proposition such as (1) turns out to
be impossible!
Lemma.  Suppose that B and [ * a ] are normal modal operators in unlimited DDL that satisfy
the following principles:
(S) [ *a ]Ba
(M) Ø B^  fi  Ø B(a  Ù  Ø Ba )
(PR) Ø [ *a ] ^
(C) Ø B^  fi  ( a  fi  [ *a ] Ø B^ )
then the agent believes every true proposition, i.e.,
a  fi  Ba ,
which in turn implies that the agent is either inconsistent or completely accurate in his beliefs,
i.e.,
Ø B^  fi  (Ba  «  a ).
Proof:  Suppose the opposite, i.e., that there is a proposition a  such that
a  Ù  Ø Ba
and go through the above argument. Q.E.D.
18
5.  Toward a solution: A two-dimensional Semantics for Full DDL
We are now going to sketch a semantics for unlimited (full) DDL which is intended to resolve
the above paradoxes.
When an introspective agent gets new information, his doxastic state undergoes a change.
Thereby the total state changes as well.  What are then his beliefs about?  The original state or
the new one?  One would like to say that he has beliefs about the old state as well as about the
new one.  In general, therefore, we have to distinguish between the state in which beliefs are
held (the point of evaluation) and the state about which certain things are believed (the point
of reference).
We are considering a semantics where each model M contains a set U of (total) states.
Each state x has two components w(x), the world component, and d (x), the doxastic compo-
nent.  We write x = (w(x), d(x)).
The doxastic component of the different states jointly determine two kinds accessibility
relations between states:5
(1) The accessibility relation that represents the agent«s beliefs:  b(x, y, z) iff z is
compatible with what the agent believes in x about y.
(2) the agent«s dispositions to revise his beliefs is represented by a relation R( *a ):
R(*a )(x, y, z) iff z is a state which the agent may reach from x by revising his
beliefs about y with a .
Since revision is a purely doxastic action, i.e., an action that does not change
the external world, the world-component is not affected from a move from x to
z by means of R( *a ), i.e., if R( *a )(x, y, z), then w(x) = w(z).
The idea of having beliefs in one state about another gives rise to a two-dimensional
semantics:
                                                
5 To be more precise, we assume that the doxastic component d(x) of a state x is a function
which to every state y assigns a doxastic state d(x)(y) that specifies the agent's views in the
evaluation point x about the reference point y.  We may speak of d(x)(y) as the agent's
doxastic state in x about y.  In a Segerberg-style semantics, we can identify each such d(x)(y)
with a hypertheory.  The hypertheory d(x)(y) specifies both which worlds are compatible
with the agent's beliefs in x about y and the agent's dispositions to change his belief state x
when he recevies new information about the state y.  (For more formal details, see Lindstrm
& Rabinowicz (1999)).
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A formula a  is, in general, true at a point x (Òthe point of evaluationÓ) with respect to a
point y (Òthe point of referenceÓ). We write this as:
x, y |=  a .
For each a  and each y ˛  U,
|| a ||y = {x ˛  U: x, y |= a }
is the proposition expressed by a  with respect to the point of reference y.
A proposition P ˝  U is worldly if it is closed under world-equivalence: whenever x ˛  P
and w(x) = w(y), then y ˛ P.
Relative to a model M, we have the following semantic clauses:
(i) if a  is atomic, then a  is assigned a worldly proposition || a || as its semantic
value; and for all x, y ˛ U,
x, y |= a  iff x ˛ || a ||.
(ii) It is not the case that x, y |= ^.
(iii) x, y |= (a  fi  b ) iff it is either the case that not: x, y |= a  or it is the case that x, y
|=Êb .
(iv) x, y |= Ba  iff
for all z such that b(x,Êy,Êz), z, y |= a .
(v) x, y |= [ *a ] b  iff
for all z such that R(*a )(x,Êy,Êz), z, y |= b .
We also extend the language with a new operator   that takes the current point of evalua-
tion and makes it the point of reference:
(vi) x, y |=  a  iff x, x |= a .
We introduce   in order to be able to distinguish between an agentÕs posterior beliefs
about his original state (the one he is in before performing a doxastic action):
(1) x, x |= [ *a ]Bb
20
and his posterior beliefs about the posterior state (the one he is in after the action):
(2) x, x |= [ *a ] Bb .
We say that a formula a  is ordinary if its truth or falsity does not depend on the point of
reference, i.e., if for all x, y, z:
x, y |= a  iff x, z |= a .
A formula is special, if it is not ordinary.
An ordinary formula a  expresses one and the same proposition (written, || a ||) with refer-
ence to every point of reference.  It is easily seen that:
(a) Boolean formulas are ordinary.
(b) For any formula a ,  a  is ordinary.
If a  is ordinary, then
x, y |=  a  iff x, y |= a .
Thus, for ordinary a ,
||  a ||Ê= || a ||.
The proposition
||  a || = {x ˛  U: x, x |= a },
we call the diagonal proposition  corresponding to a .
We say that a formula a  is true at the point x if and only if x, x |= a .  In other words, a  is
true at x if and only if the proposition || a ||x expressed by a  with reference to x is true at the
point x itself.
We say that a formula a  is valid  (or weakly valid) in the model M (in symbols, M |= a ) if
and only if a  is true at every point in M.
Let us say that a pair <x, y> of points in U is normal  if x = y.  We have defined truth at a
point x as truth relative to the normal pair <x, x>, and we have defined validity in a model M
as truth relative to all normal pairs in M.
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There is another notion of validity in a model:  We say that a  is strongly valid in the model
M if and only if, for every pair of points <x, y> in M, x, y |= a .  Of course, if a  is strongly
valid in M, then a  is valid in M.  The converse does not hold in general.  Consider, for exam-
ple,
a  «   a .
Every instance of this schema is weakly valid in every model.  However, if a  is a special for-
mula, then a  «   a  is not strongly valid.
Notice, however, that for every model M, a  is weakly valid in M if and only if   a  is
strongly valid in M.
6.  How the two-dimensional semantics handles the paradoxes
Consider a model M that strongly validates the following conditions:
(P) Ø BØa  fi  (Bb  fi  [ *a ]Bb ) (Preservation)
(S) [ *a ]Ba (Success)
From the strong validity of (P) and (S) in M, we can infer that also the following formula is
strongly valid in M:
(1) Ø BØa  Ù  BØ Ba  fi  [ *a ](Ba  Ù  BØ Ba ),
This formula was previously considered paradoxical.  However, the meaning of the formula
has changed from the old semantics to the new one: it is no longer paradoxical.  To see this,
one should compare (1) with:
(2) Ø BØa  Ù  BØ Ba  fi  [ *a ] (Ba  Ù  BØ Ba ),
which is indeed paradoxical.  However, (2) is, of course, not even weakly valid.
While (1) is about what the agent, after having learned a , would believe about the state
prior to the revision, (2) is about what he then would believe about the state obtaining after
the revision.  There is no reason to suppose that (2) would hold.
Consider now the case in which:
(3) x, x |= a  Ù  Ø Ba ,
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The agent then learns (3) and revises his beliefs about the point x with this information.  By
Success:
(4) x, x |= [ * ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )]B(a  Ù  Ø Ba ),
but there is nothing paradoxical about (4), since the beliefs that are referred to in the formula
following the revision operator are all about the prior state x and not about the one posterior
to the revision.  In contrast to (2), the following situation would be paradoxical:
(5) x, x |= [ * ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )] B(a  Ù  Ø Ba ).
But the formula occurring in (5) is of course not (even weakly) valid.
But what about the following formula?
(6) [ *  ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )]B (a  Ù  Ø Ba ).
IsnÕt this formula valid, by Success?  Yes, indeed it is.  What it says, is that if one revises
oneÕs original beliefs with the diagonal proposition  ( a  Ù  Ø Ba ), then, in the posterior state,
one will have the belief about the prior state that  ( a  Ù  Ø Ba ) was true then.  In our example,
however, this posterior belief about the prior state is in fact true.  Hence, there is nothing
paradoxical about it.
The formula (6) may be contrasted with:
(7) [ *  ( a  Ù  Ø Ba )] B(a  Ù  Ø Ba ),
which says that the agent after revision with  ( a  Ù  Ø Ba ) would believe a  Ù  Ø Ba  about his
posterior state.  This would indeed be paradoxical.  But this formula is not even weakly valid,
so no paradox is forthcoming.
In the two-dimensional semantics, we can impose various introspection principles, like
(PI), (NI), (VPI), (VNI).  These principles do not lead to trouble as long as we only assume
them to be weakly, rather than strongly, valid.
Our conclusion is that the two-dimensional semantics avoids the original paradoxes, with-
out Ð as far as we can see Ð creating new ones.  This semantics has one serious drawback,
however: it only determines the agentÕs posterior beliefs about the prior state:
(1) [ *a ]Bb
What we would like to infer, however, are posterior beliefs about the posterior state:
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(2) [ *a ] Bb .
Thus, we would like to have some transfer principles: at least for all the Boolean formulas b ,
we would like it to be valid that
(3) [ *a ](Bb fi   Bb ),
(4) [ *a ]( Ø Bb fi   Ø Bb ).
Such principles would allow us to infer from one of [* a ]Bb , < * a >Bb , [ *a ] Ø Bb , < * a > Ø Bb ,
to the corresponding statements about the posterior state: [ * a ] Bb , < *a > Bb , [ *a ]  Ø Bb ,
< *a >  Ø Bb , respectively.
In fact, even with respect to beliefs in doxastic propositions, there should be a large meas-
ure of agreement between posterior beliefs of this kind regarding the prior and the posterior
state. If I initially believe that I believe the earth to be round, then after the revision with some
information about, say, the weather in Sweden, I will keep my beliefs about what I believe to
be the shape of the earth both with regard to my prior state and with regard to the posterior
state. But transfer principles for posterior beliefs in doxastic propositions are much more dif-
ficult to formulate: many posterior beliefs about doxastic propositions are not transferable, as
we have seen.
This shows that there is work that remains to be done. Still, we have at least made some
first steps towards the development of a two-dimensional semantics for unlimited DDL. It is
to be hoped that this project can be further developed.
7.  Forward-looking revision
The main intuition behind the two-dimensional approach is that the new information that we
revise with is a proposition about an antecedently specified state.  We learn something new
about the given state and revise our other beliefs about that state accordingly.  Since we the-
reby move to a new state, we also acquire various beliefs about the state we have reached, but
this latter change is, in a sense, secondary, as compared with the modification of our beliefs
about the state we have originally considered.  Thus, this view of revision is essentially
backward-looking.  Normally, the antecedently specified state will simply be the state in
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which we were originally situated.  A belief change caused by perception or introspection
seems to be a typical example of backward-looking revision.
A different conception of revision would see this doxastic action as a forward-looking
task: for a given proposition a, the agent is asked to change his beliefs in such a way that he
comes to believe a about the state that obtains after the revision. (An apt example might be a
computer that is given a task to re-organize its ÒbeliefsÓ in such a way as to accommodate a .)
This kind of forward-looking revision cannot be expressed using the revision operator
introduced above, in section 5.  As we remember, the truth condition for that operator is as
follows:
 (v) x, y |= [ *a ] b  iff for all z such that R( *a )(x, y, z), z, y |= b .
In this condition, the state y about which we receive new information a  is fixed beforehand,
along with the prior state x.  It cannot be required that y coincides with a posterior state z,
since the appropriate candidates for z can only be determined after y has been fixed: z is any
state such that R( *a )(x, y, z), and it would only be a happy coincidence if z turned out to
coincide with y.
Let us refer to the forward-looking revision as ¯ .  For the revision operator that corres-
ponds to this doxastic action, we would need another truth condition:
(vÕ) x, y |= [ ¯a ] b  iff for all z such that R( *a )(x, y, z), z, z |= b .
Note that, in this truth condition, the reference to y is idle.  Since the new information is sup-
posed to be about the posterior state, the need for an antecedently specified point of reference
disappears.  Thus, if we only want to discuss forward-looking revision, we might just as well
give up the two-dimensional approach altogether and go back to the standard one-dimensional
semantics.  Instead of (vÕ), we then have a simpler condition:
x |= [ ¯a ] b  iff for all z such that R( *a )(x, z), z |= b .
Similarly, we might replace the two-dimensional truth condition for the belief operator with
its standard one-dimensional version:
x |= Ba  iff for all z such that b(x, z), z |= a .
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In this condition, it is implicitly assumed that the beliefs held in a given state are about the
state in which they are held.
It should be clear that forward-looking revision need not obey Preservation: Moving to a
state in which one believes a  may well necessitate adjustments in various higher-order beli-
efs.  This is the lesson of Story 1 above.  On the other hand, it seems reasonable to demand
that forward-looking revision should obey Success.  But then, as Story 2 shows, we must
accept that revising with a consistent proposition sometimes will be impossible on pain of
inconsistency .  A Moorean proposition a  Ù  Ø Ba  is consistent, but if I get as a task to move
to a state in which I believe that proposition about that state itself, I will have to end up with
inconsistent beliefs.  In this sense, a proposition like this is a doxastic blindspot: It can be
true, but it cannot be believed without inconsistency.
Some suggestions as to how to characterize this kind of forward-looking revision within
unlimited DDL are to be found in Lindstrm & Rabinowicz (1999) (cf. our discussion of what
we call Òcautious revisionÓ).  But we are fully aware of the fact that the suggestions offered
are still very preliminary.
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